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Abstract – We study the effect of contingent movement on the persistence of cooperation on
complex networks with empty nodes. Each agent plays Prisoner’s Dilemma game with its neigh-
bors and then it either updates the strategy depending on the payoff difference with neighbors
or it moves to another empty node if not satisfied with its own payoff. If no neighboring node is
empty, each agent stays at the same site. By extensive evolutionary simulations, we show that the
medium density of agents enhances cooperation where the network flow of mobile agents is also
medium. Moreover, if the movements of agents are more frequent than the strategy updating,
cooperation is further promoted. In scale-free networks, the optimal density for cooperation is
lower than other networks because agents get stuck at hubs. Our study suggests that keeping a
smooth network flow is significant for the persistence of cooperation in ever-changing societies.
Introduction. – One important biological and social
issue is the persistence of cooperation. Cooperation is dis-
advantageous compared to defection because such behav-
ior results in some costs to oneself by giving benefits to
others. In contrast, defection receives the benefits with-
out paying any cost. Therefore, cooperation cannot be an
evolutionarily stable strategy for a noniterative game in a
well-mixed population [1–5].
In such a situation, network reciprocity can account for
the persistence of cooperation [6,7] (See also some reviews
[8, 9]). Some pioneering studies used spatial Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game to consider the effect of network reci-
procity on the evolution of cooperation where agents’ loca-
tions are fixed. In some co-evolutionary models of network
topology and strategy [10–14], agents can change interact-
ing partners by severing one link and building a new link.
This behavior promotes cooperation when the rewiring
links create cooperative groups. Even in this case, agents’
locations are still fixed. However, in reality, biological or-
ganisms usually interact with others at locations that are
not fixed. Rather, they interact with others by moving
if spaces are available. In the first attempt of the evolu-
tion of cooperation with mobility, spaces are not explicitly
considered [15]. Then, various models which explicitly as-
sume two dimensional space (discrete or continuous) with
empty sites have been developed [16–33].
In those studies, a square lattice is usually used as the
discrete interaction environment. For continuous environ-
ments, two dimensional continuous space is used. In both
cases, the environments are homogeneous. This may not
be appropriate to describe real interactions because they
could be biased due to the heterogeneity of environments.
For example, in human society, people do not interact at
every place. When people are walking on a road, they just
pass by without interaction. In the case where a person
yields to another on a road, there are some interactions be-
tween them, but still weak. Interactions take place where
people gather such as schools, local groups, and offices
etc. To realize the heterogeneous environments, we use
complex networks for the interaction space and reveal the
effect of heterogeneity.
Another important aspect is the type of movements.
First, unconditional movements have been studied for
the evolution of cooperation [17, 25–27, 29, 31, 32]. Un-
conditional movements means that agents move to ran-
domly selected empty sites with some probability. In
this case, frequent movements prohibit cooperation be-
cause cooperative clusters, which are needed for cooper-
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ation to evolve, are destroyed, therefore moderate mobil-
ity facilitates cooperation [17, 27]. Cooperation is signif-
icantly enhanced when contingent movements are intro-
duced [18–24, 28, 30, 32, 33]. Here we assume contingent
movements because it only requires minimum intelligence
such as detecting the condition of the present location,
which allows us to apply the mechanism to a broad range
of biological organisms.
In the present paper, we investigate the contingent
movements of agents on complex networks with empty
nodes. Note that, in our model, the underlying network
topology never changes. However, their actual interactions
(who plays the PD with whom) change because agents
move around on empty nodes. We show that, when the
density of agents are medium, cooperation is significantly
enhanced. The optimal density decreases in the case of
scale-free networks because agents get stuck at hubs.
Model. – We developed an agent-based model in
which n agents play the PD game, update their strat-
egy, and change the location by movements on complex
networks. We compared three different networks; Ran-
dom Regular Graph (RRG), Lattice, and Baraba´si-Albert
scale-free networks (BA) [34]. RRG and Lattice can be
classified as homogeneous networks because all nodes have
the same degree, while BA is different from those homo-
geneous networks and can be classified as a heterogeneous
network. In BA, a small number of nodes, called hubs,
connect with a substantial number of links while most
other nodes connect with a few others. Each network size
is represented by N with the average degree k and the
density of agents is ρ. Thus, n is given by n = Nρ.
Initially, n agents are randomly placed on the nodes
in a network. Each agent can take one of two strategies
in the PD game: Cooperation (C) or Defection (D). At
first, half of the agents are allocated C and the other half
allocated D.
In each time step, one agent, denoted i, is randomly
picked up. Agent i plays the PD game with ki neighbors
and obtains the payoff. The payoff is divided by ki and
the average payoff is denoted by pii. The neighbors also
play the PD game with their own neighbors and obtain
the payoff. The neighbors’ payoffs are also averaged. In
each game, both individuals obtain payoff R for mutual
cooperation or P for mutual defection. If one selects coop-
eration while the other does defection, the former obtains
the sucker’s payoff S while the latter obtains the highest
payoff T , the temptation to defect. The relationship of the
four payoffs is usually T > R > P > S in the PD games.
For simplicity, we use T > 1, R = 1, P = 0, S = 1 − T .
Thus T is the only parameter for PD. This form of the
PD game is called the donor-recipient (or donation) game
where two parameters b (benefit) and c (cost) for coopera-
tion are assumed [35]. Our parametrization is further sim-
plified because of only one parameter, T , which is realized
by letting T = b > 1 and c = b−1 from the donor-recipient
game. For more details, pairwise games including PD can
be generalized by consideringDg (gamble-intending; GID)
and Dr (risk-averting; RAD) dilemmas [11,36,37]. In each
time step, either movement or strategy updating always
takes place. With probability τm, the movement phase
is selected. In the opposite case, i.e., with probability
τs = 1 − τm, the strategy updating phase is selected. We
can consider τm and τs as the parameters that adjust time-
scale of evolution between movement (topological change
of interaction) and strategy updating. Pacheco et al. re-
vealed that cooperation is enhanced when the topological
change takes place faster than strategy updating [13].
When the movement phase is selected, agent i moves to
another neighboring empty node with probability pm,i =
T−pii
T−S
. It becomes 1 when the average payoff pim,i is equal
to S. The probability linearly decreases as pim,i increases.
Finally, it becomes 0 when the average payoff pim,i is
equal to T . As S = 1 − T , pm,i can be rewritten as
pm,i =
T−pii
2T−1 . Agent i does not move if no neighboring
node is empty. This type of movement can be considered
contingent movement [18–24, 28, 30, 32] because an agent
tends to move to another node if the current node is unfa-
vorable in the sense that the current location gives a lower
payoff. In those models, on the other hand, agents do not
move when they are satisfied with the payoff in the cur-
rent location. Instead, when the strategy updating phase
is selected, we use the pairwise comparison rule [38–40].
In short, agent i randomly selects one of the neighbors j
and agent i imitates j’s strategy with the probability
ps,i = [1 + e
−β(pij−pii)]−1, (1)
where β ≥ 0 controls the intensity of selection. For β = 0,
there is no selection pressure, meaning that evolution-
ary dynamics proceeds by random drift. As β becomes
larger, the tendency that strategies with higher payoffs
will be imitated increases. We set β = 0.1. This falls into
the framework of evolutionary games because the strat-
egy with higher fitness will be imitated more often. These
movement and strategy updating phases (either one is se-
lected in each time step) are repeated G generations. One
generation is defined as n time steps where agents are ac-
tivated (movement or strategy) once on average. We use
g for specifying generation where 0 ≤ g ≤ G.
Results. – To check the evolution of cooperation, we
calculated the fraction of cooperation in the last 10% of
generations in each simulation. Because the time scale
for the strategy updating τs is different in each setting,
we set G = 106/(nτs) in order to keep the number of
strategy updating the same in the different settings. We
conducted 50 independent simulation runs and the average
fraction of cooperation was used for describing each data
point in the result graphs. The network size for RRG and
BA is N = 5000 while Lattice is N = 712 = 5041. The
average degree in all networks is k = 4. The other three
parameters; T, τm(= 1− τs), and ρ are swept as the main
experimental parameters. In the results, two of them are
changed while the other one is fixed.
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We first show the fraction of cooperation on T − τm
space (Fig. 1). In all networks, cooperation decreases as
T increases. This is simply because larger T gives benefits
to defectors. The effect of τm on cooperation is also sim-
ple. Because agents use contingent movements, there is a
greater chance for cooperators to make clusters before they
are exploited by defectors when τm is large. In contrast,
if τm is low, cooperators become defectors more often be-
cause cooperators are weak in the case that cooperative
clusters are not generated. In Lattice networks, the dy-
namics are slightly different with RRG and BA networks
where the middle τm is optimal for cooperation when T
is high. There may be many local cooperative clusters in
Lattice networks. In that case, if τm is too high, those
local clusters tend to collapse due to the high frequency
of movements which has harmful effects on cooperation.
We next focus on the effect of ρ on cooperation where
τm = 0.9 is fixed (Top in Fig. 2). Interestingly, the max-
imum cooperation level is obtained in the intermediate
value of ρ (around 0.5) in RRG and Lattice networks. The
tendency that the high frequency of movement (0.5 ≤ τm)
and the medium value of density (0.1 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.8) in RRG
and Lattice networks promote cooperation the most is also
verified in ρ−τm space with T = 1.5 (Bottom in Fig. 2). To
reveal the reason, we conducted additional experiments.
In each simulation of the additional experiments, we cal-
culated the number of average times that agents actually
moved. Then, we defined a new metric “Flow” which was
obtained as the value of ρ multiplied by the average rate
of movement in one time step. Top in Fig. 3 shows the
relationship between ρ and flow. In every network, the
maximum flow is obtained in the middle of ρ values. This
is because if the density is too high, almost all space is oc-
cupied by someone in the neighboring spaces. In this case,
only a few agents can move, resulting in the drastic de-
crease of the number of movement times. As a result, the
maximum flow is realized in the medium ρ. This is well
known in traffic flow where traffic jams occur once the
density of cars exceeds the critical limit [41–44]. Bottom
in Fig. 3 shows the relationship between flow and fraction
of cooperation. We obtain the highest cooperation level
when the flow is not too large (between 0.10 and 0.15 in
RRG and Lattice networks and between 0.05 and 0.125 in
BA networks). If flow is low, contingent movement does
not work well because the network is sparse. In the oppo-
site case where flow is too high, contingent movement also
does not work well because high flow destroys the clusters
of cooperation, making a well-mixed situation. Thus, the
intermediate flow most promotes cooperation. We show
that network flow is the key for the evolution of coopera-
tion.
The optimal cooperation level in BA networks is ob-
tained lower ρ (Top in Fig. 2 BA) than the one in RRG
and Lattice networks, and so we consider the reason. Fig-
ure 4 shows the actual dynamics of movement and coop-
eration on networks at initial generations although each
network size is greatly reduced for the sake of visualiza-
tion (N = 36). In BA networks, the locations of agents
almost do not change as time goes by (g = 0 to g = 2).
This is because hubs can be the bottleneck of movements.
Because almost all (peripheral) nodes are only connected
to the hubs, agents have to pass through the hubs when
they move to other nodes. Therefore, once hubs are occu-
pied by someone, agents in peripheral nodes cannot move
and get stuck in the current node. Note that this is not
the case for agents on hubs. We investigated the number
of times that agents on the largest hub moved. We set
the situation the same as Fig.4 and counted the number
of times that agents on the hub moved from g = 0 to 1000.
The results were mean 332.8 times with SD of 23.7 when
all the nodes became C and mean 463.9 times with SD of
22.1 when all the nodes became D. We ran one hundred
simulations for each setting. The former is less compared
to the latter because agents tend not to move when they
are satisfied. Thus, agents on the hub are frequently re-
placed because there are many empty nodes around the
hub. See also the supplemental movie which shows what
happened to the hub. Due to this situation, it is difficult
for agents on peripheral nodes to move in BA networks
compared to the cases in RRG and Lattice networks even
when the same ρ is given. This is why the flow on BA
networks is optimal in lower values of ρ compared to RRG
and Lattice.
We finally focus on how the optimal flow for cooperation
is affected by T (Fig. 5). In any networks, if T is low, only
the low level flow is realized because almost all agents are
satisfied with their payoffs and do not move. As T becomes
larger, flow increases. In this case, cooperation is most
promoted when flow is medium, which allows cooperators
to make clusters easier.
Conclusion. – In this paper, we studied the effect
of network flow on the evolution of cooperation by the
means of agent-based evolutionary simulations. We used
two classes of networks: homogeneous (RRG and Lattice)
and heterogeneous (BA). We revealed that, in the presence
of contingent movement, the medium density of agents
enhances cooperation where the network flow of mobile
agents is also medium. The optimal density for BA net-
works is relatively lower than RRG and Lattice networks
because hubs create the bottleneck of network flow. More-
over, if the movements of agents are more frequent than
the strategy updating, cooperation is further promoted.
We first showed that the flow of the network significantly
affects cooperation on networks.
∗ ∗ ∗
G.I. acknowledges the support by Hayao Nakayama
Foundation For Science & Technology & Culture.
REFERENCES
[1] Nowak M. A., Evolutionary dynamics: Exploring the
p-3
G. Ichinose et al.
RRG Lattice BA
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
T
τm
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
C
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Fig. 3: Top: Relationship between ρ and Flow. Flow is defined as the value of ρ multiplied by the average rate of movement in
one time step. Bottom: Fraction of cooperation as a function of Flow. T = 1.5 and τm = 0.9 are fixed. In both cases, one data
point is dotted per one simulation instead of averaging 50 simulations.
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Fig. 4: Actual dynamics of movement and cooperation on the three networks at initial generations. For visualization, we used
quite a small population N = 36 and ρ = 0.583 but the dynamics are the same with the simulations used in the results. In the
BA network, the degrees of each node are different and the size of each node reflects its degree. Agents tend to get stuck in the
BA network compared to the other networks because the hubs create the bottleneck of network flow.
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Fig. 5: Top: Fraction of cooperation on T − F low space. τm = 0.9 is fixed. The gray color denotes that the flow is not realized
in those settings.
p-7
